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Perspective taking plays an important role in different areas of psychological and neuro-
scientiﬁc research. Visual perspective taking is an especially prominent approach generally
using one of two experimental tasks: in the own-body-transformation task observers are
asked to judge the laterality of a salient feature of a human ﬁgure (e.g., is the glove on the
left or right hand?) from the ﬁgure’s perspective. In the avatar-in-scene task they decide
about the laterality of objects in a scene (e.g., is the ﬂower on the left or right?) from the
avatar’s point of view. Increases in latencies and/or errors are interpreted as originating from
additional cognitive processes predominately described as observer-based perspective
transformations. A closer look reveals that such an account is disputable on grounds related
to the use of laterality judgments. Other transformation accounts, i.e., object or array
transformations, as well as non-transformational accounts, i.e., extra processing due to
spatial conﬂicts, have not been adequately considered, tested, or ruled out by existing
research. Our review examines visual perspective tasks in detail, identiﬁes problems and
makes recommendations for future research.
Keywords: spatial cognition, embodiment, visual perspective taking, mental transformation, own-body-
transformation task, laterality tasks, spatial S-R compatibility, agency
INTRODUCTION
Research on human perspective taking is gaining momentum as
can be seen by the increasing number of experimental studies in
different research areas, such as spatial reasoning, mental imagery,
life-span cognitive development, theory of mind, empathy, avi-
ation research, and teleoperations. The different ﬁelds have in
common that they want to come up with accounts of the cognitive
mechanismsunderlying the ability tomentally switch into and spa-
tially act from perspectives that are not our own, and sometimes
those of others.
Two fundamentally different lines of research on spatial per-
spective taking can be distinguished: Research on mental perspec-
tive taking uses memory-based testing methods. In one line of
work, participants ﬁrst learn a layout of objects and are then asked
to point to the previously learned objects without being able to
look at the scene while bodily or imaginally switching into various
perspectives. Measures of geometric differences between learned,
body-deﬁned and to-be-imagined perspectives have been found to
be good predictors of pointing latencies and errors, and results are
used to test competing processing accounts (e.g., Rieser, 1989;
Easton and Sholl, 1995; Shelton and McNamara, 1997; Creem-
Regehr, 2003; May, 2004; Avraamides and Kelly, 2008). Other
studies examine mental perspective taking by using language,
graphics, or maps as learning input and with other testing pro-
cedures (e.g., De Vega et al., 1996; Bryant and Tversky, 1999;
Avraamides, 2003; Sohn and Carlson, 2003).
Research on visual perspective taking, on the other hand, uses
perception-based testing methods. Participants usually look at a
visual display including a human ﬁgure, and have to decide about
the side of a critical feature of the ﬁgure while adopting the ﬁgure’s
perspective (OBT or own-body transformation task; e.g., Par-
sons, 1987), or about relative object positions from the ﬁgure’s
point of view (AIS or avatar-in-scene task; e.g., Amorim, 2003).
Although both tasks are usually treated separately in the litera-
ture, the majority of OBT- and AIS-studies have in common that
they use laterality decisions, i.e., observers have to make left or
right judgments about absolute or relative object locations from
the ﬁgure’s point of view. Recently, the number of behavioral and
neurophysiological studies on visual perspective taking has been
growing (Blanke et al., 2005; Creem-Regehr et al., 2007; Kessler
and Thomson, 2010; Yu and Zacks, 2010; Dalecki et al., 2012 and
others reviewed here). Note, that studies on viewpoint-dependent
object (Tarr and Bülthoff, 1998) or scene recognition (Diwadkar
and McNamara, 1997) are not considered, as their focus is on
memory-based identiﬁcation processes, and not on perspective
taking.
The overall picture of ﬁndings on visual perspective taking is
complex. In general, one ﬁnds increases in response times and
errors the larger the spatial difference between the observer’s and
the ﬁgure’s spatial perspective. This is taken to reﬂect additional
cognitive processes described as observer-based perspective trans-
formations (PT). In contrast to this widely held view, our review
will argue that alternative accounts, e.g., object transformations
(OT) of the ﬁgure in the OBT-task, or array transformations
(AT) in the AIS-task, have been brought forth, but so far have
not been systematically evaluated and pursued. Furthermore,
the review will show that combining visual perspective taking
tasks with laterality judgments leads to spatially compatible and
incompatible responses, with consequences that have not been
adequately addressed up to now.
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TASKS AND BASIC FINDINGS
OWN-BODY TRANSFORMATION TASK
Experiments using the OBT task show an isolated human ﬁgure
with a salient body feature (e.g., a glove, a hand-held ball or disk).
The observer’s task is to decide whether the salient feature is on
the left or right as seen from the ﬁgure’s point of view and to
respond by pressing a left- or right-hand key (or using another
response indicating left and right). Figure 1 shows examples of
OBT-stimuli.
Consistent with the notion that observers mentally transform
their own perspective until it matches the ﬁgure’s perspective
before deciding about laterality, responses usually are faster for
back-facing ﬁgures, i.e., when ﬁgures look in the same direc-
tion as the observer, compared to front-facing ﬁgures, i.e., when
observer and ﬁgure look in opposite directions (Parsons, 1987;
Zacks et al., 1999; Blanke et al., 2005; Jola and Mast, 2005; Arzy
et al., 2006, 2007; Mohr et al., 2006, 2010; Gardner and Potts, 2010,
2011; Thakkar andPark,2010; Braithwaite et al.,2011; Steggemann
et al., 2011; Gardner et al., 2012; Gronholm et al., 2012; May and
Wendt, 2012). No such performance differences are found when
observers have to decide about the laterality of the critical fea-
ture from their own perspective (referred to as which-side-task),
rather than from the avatar’s perspective (Blanke et al., 2005; Gard-
ner and Potts, 2010, 2011; Braithwaite et al., 2011; Gardner et al.,
2012). In support of a PT account of these ﬁndings, more than
half of the participants report to switch into the avatar’s perspec-
tivewhen solving the task (Parsons, 1987; Zacks andTversky, 2005;
Gronholm et al., 2012).
FIGURE 1 | Examples of OBT-stimuli.The task of the observer is to
decide whether the ﬁgure’s left or right hand is highlighted by a critical
feature (green or red disc), and to press a corresponding left- or right-hand
key. Various stimuli and features (e.g., human or abstract ﬁgures, gloved
hand, ball or disc in hand) are used in actual experiments. Left side:
Different upright ﬁgure stimuli (A and B) with compatible (tick mark) and
incompatible (cross) correct responses. Right side: Different ﬁgures with
rotations of 30° and 180° in the picture plane (C and D) with compatible
(tick mark) and incompatible (cross) correct responses. Only ﬁgures with
the critical feature on the ﬁgure’s left hand are shown; compatibilities are
the same for features on the ﬁgure’s right hand.
AVATAR-IN-SCENE TASK
Experiments using the AIS-task show an avatar (or a different
symbol indicating the relevant perspective) looking at a spatial
scene from varying angles of rotation in the horizontal plane. The
observer’s task is to decide whether a critical object in the scene
(e.g., ﬂower) is on the left or right side from the avatar’s point of
view. Figure 2 provides examples of AIS-stimuli.
Response times for laterality judgments grow monotonically
with the disparity of the avatar’s and the participant’s perspec-
tives (e.g., Keehner et al., 2006; Michelon and Zacks, 2006; Kessler
and Rutherford, 2010; Kessler and Thomson, 2010; Kockler et al.,
2010). Similar to the back-facing advantage in the OBT task, these
ﬁndings have been interpreted in terms of time to transform one’s
own perspective into the avatar’s perspective.
THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS OF VISUAL PERSPECTIVE TAKING
The above interpretations of OBT- andAIS-studies have been used
to identify brain regions mediating visual perspective taking (e.g.,
Zacks et al., 1999, 2002; Blanke et al., 2005), and also to look into
processing strategies used with human and non-human stimuli
(e.g., Yu and Zacks, 2010). It turns out, however, that observed
performances in laterality judgment tasks lead to difﬁculties when
researchers try to interpret them as indicators of PTs. In the fol-
lowing, we look at existing evidence from the perspective of a
PT-account, and at arguments used to defend it against competing
OT/AT-accounts, or spatial compatibility explanations.
CONFOUNDING SPATIAL TRANSFORMATIONS AND RESPONSE
CONFLICTS
Under a variety of conditions, responses are faster and less error-
prone when a target is presented at a location that spatially
corresponds with the location of the requested response as com-
pared to situations where the target location spatially corresponds
with an incorrect response (Proctor and Vu, 2006). Dual-route
models attribute such S-R compatibility effects to automatic
activation of the spatially corresponding response along a process-
ing route largely independent of intention-based S-R translation
processes (Hommel, 1993; De Jong et al., 1994).
Spatial compatibility in OBT-tasks
Figure 1 shows that the location of the target feature spatially
corresponds with the correct response for the back-facing upright
ﬁgurewhereas it correspondswith the incorrect response when the
ﬁgure is shown front-facing. Spatial compatibility should facilitate
responses to back-facing compared to front-facing ﬁgures. Inter-
mediate orientations of the OBT-ﬁgure in the depth plane can be
presumed to lead to graded compatibility effects.
Spatial compatibility in AIS-tasks
The AIS-task is in most aspects similar to the OBT-task, and sim-
ilar problems arise (see Figure 2). On the one hand, and different
from the centered presentation of OBT-stimuli, the positioning of
the avatar-object-ensemble on the screen, can shift to the left or
right from the screen’s center, potentially producing independent
spatial (i.e., Simon-type) compatibility effects. On the other hand,
and similar to the OBT-task, the relative position of the target
object (left/right) within the ensemble as seen from the observer’s
perspective, corresponds to the laterality of the correct response up
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FIGURE 2 | Examples of AIS-stimuli.The task of the observer is to decide
whether the critical object (green or red disc) is on the right or left as seen
from the avatar’s perspective, and to press a corresponding left- or right-hand
key. Different scenes illustrate compatible (tick mark) and incompatible (cross)
correct responses for different rotations of the avatar in the depth plane. Left
side: Stimuli that request relative judgments (A, B): Is the left or right stimulus
from the avatar’s perspective the critical one? Right side: Stimuli that request
absolute judgments (C, D): is the critical object on the left or right side from
the avatar’s perspective? Only ﬁgures with the critical object on the avatar’s
left side are shown; compatibilities are the same for right-side objects.
to rotation angles of 90◦. In contrast, rotations larger than 90◦ lead
to a reversal of this situation, yielding spatial S-R-correspondence
in the former case, and spatial non-correspondence in the lat-
ter case. Again, spatial compatibility and incompatibility should
be maximal for avatars in the 0◦ (back-facing) and 180◦ (front-
facing) positions, and might produce gradual effects for inter-
mediate rotations. Both problems are rarely addressed in the
literature.
Empirical evidence for spatial compatibility effects
Several ﬁndings are consistent with the assumption that OBT-
performances are inﬂuenced by spatial compatibility. For instance,
Gardner and Potts (2011, Exp. 1; Parsons, 1987, Exp. 2a) used
vocal “left” and “right” responses, which are known to produce
smaller compatibility effects than manual responses, and found
a reduced back-facing advantage. Moreover, some manipula-
tions which reversed the assigned correspondence values yielded
a back-facing disadvantage. For instance, Arzy et al. (2006) asked
participants to treat the depicted ﬁgure as a mirror reﬂection of
their own body, and obtained slower responses for back-facing as
compared to front-facing ﬁgures, while at the same time observ-
ing thewell-known back-facing advantagewith standardOBT task
instructions.
Other studies presented the ﬁgure in different orientations
in the picture plane, including upside-down versions, for which
front-facing ﬁgures come with spatially corresponding, and back-
facing ﬁgures with spatially conﬂicting responses (Figure 1).
Upside-down presentation of ﬁgures either reduced (Steggemann
et al., 2011), or even changed the back-facing advantage into a
disadvantage (Parsons, 1987; Zacks et al., 1999; Jola and Mast,
2005; May and Wendt, 2012). Furthermore, Gardner and Potts
(2011, Exp. 2) obtained a back-facing disadvantage by instruct-
ing participants to cross their hands and decide about laterality
by key-presses with their corresponding hand, thereby reversing
laterality and response locations (see, however, May and Wendt,
2012, for a back-facing advantage with uncrossed arms when left
and right keys were labeled “right” and “left,” respectively).
Although this review focuses on perceptual laterality judg-
ment tasks for which the confound of facing direction and
compatibility is most obvious it should be noted that Simon-
like spatial interference effects have also been found with respect
to a remembered previous location of a current stimulus (e.g.,
Zhang and Johnson, 2004). More generally, the problem of spa-
tial compatibility is also present in memory-based perspective
taking tasks and has been subject of thorough discussion (e.g.,
May, 2004). Furthermore, perception- and memory-based tasks
not asking for laterality decisions (e.g., color judgments) may
induce spatial compatibility effects if the location of the response
varies with respect to the same spatial dimension as the target
stimulus feature (e.g., indicating red and green with left- and
right-side key presses, respectively). Other tasks with non-spatial
decision criteria (e.g., same-different, visibility, or numerosity
judgments) could also induce spatial conﬂicts. In such cases itmust
be ensured that compatibility levels are balanced across facing
directions.
Controlling for spatial compatibility
Attempts to control for compatibility have used ﬁgures with an
outstretched arm across the body midline, where observers make
laterality decisions regarding the outstretched arm. Although a
back-facing advantage was also found for such ﬁgures (Parsons,
1987, Exp. 2b), this evidence is not conclusive, as it is possible that
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participants respond on the basis of a non-switching body feature
such as the shoulder (Jola and Mast, 2005). Avoiding this prob-
lem, May and Wendt (2012) controlled for spatial compatibility
by using horizontal ﬁgures (i.e., 90◦-rotated) with hands equidis-
tant to the ﬁgure’s upper and lower end; in spite of this arguably
neutral conditions, a clear back-facing advantage was found
(see also Parsons, 1987; Jola and Mast, 2005; Steggemann et al.,
2011).
LITTLE INDUBITABLE EVIDENCE FOR PERSPECTIVE
TRANSFORMATIONS
Since the spatial end-state of PTs can principally also be
reached by spatially equivalent OTs of the ﬁgure in the OBT-
task, or ATs of the avatar-object-ensemble in the AIS-task,
both constitute potential alternative explanations for the typ-
ical facing direction effects found in both tasks. OTs have
been extensively studied in mental rotation research, by pre-
senting a stimulus that differs in orientation from a second
version of the same stimulus, or that is moved away from
its canonical orientation, while asking participants to make a
same/mirror-reversed judgment. Such studies show monotonic
increasing reaction time (RT)-slopes for increasing rotation an-
gles in both the picture and the depth plane (Shepard and Cooper,
1982).
Slope differences as evidence for PT
Slope differences play an important role in studies usingOBT-tasks
which try to distinguish between PT- and OT-accounts. These
studies include rotations in the picture plane, and ﬁnd slope differ-
ences for back- and front-facing ﬁgures. While **RTs increase with
rotation angle for back-facing ﬁgures, slopes are strongly reduced,
absent, or even reversed for front-facing ﬁgures (Parsons, 1987;
Jola and Mast, 2005; Zacks and Tversky, 2005; Yu and Zacks, 2010;
Steggemann et al., 2011; May and Wendt, 2012, Exp. 2; Zacks
et al., 2000, 2002). Thus, performances for back-facing (but not for
front-facing) ﬁgures are consistent with ﬁndings from research on
mental rotation with same vs. mirror-reversed objects. The miss-
ing slopes in laterality decisions for front-facing ﬁgures have been
repeatedly taken as evidence for PT-accounts (e.g., Yu and Zacks,
2010). For this argument to work, minimal costs for transforma-
tions in the picture plane have to be postulated. This constraint
can be met by assuming that PTs are realized as shortest path spa-
tial transformations; i.e., all rotation trajectories of observer-based
switches into front-facing ﬁgures have the same rotation angle (i.e.,
180◦), irrespective of the ﬁgure’s orientation in the picture plane
(see Parsons, 1987, p. 190).
Alternative explanations for slope differences
The observed slope differences for rotations in the picture
plane can also be accounted for by compatibility assumptions
(May and Wendt, 2012). Speciﬁcally, ﬁgures presented upside-
down reverse S-R-compatibility values; i.e., compatible responses
become incompatible, and vice versa. Applied to upside-down
ﬁgures this means, that back-facing ﬁgures produce spatial con-
ﬂicts, while front-facing ﬁgures donot (see Figure 1). Intermediate
rotations of the upright ﬁgure in the picture plane, should lead to
graded effects of compatibility.
PT- vs. OT-instructions
Independent support for PT-assumptions comes from experi-
ments that use particular transformation instructions. Speciﬁcally,
Zacks and Tversky (2005) observed positive RT-slopes for front-
facing ﬁgures in a laterality judgment task when participants
were asked to use object rotation strategies on the ﬁgures. How-
ever, near-zero slopes were found when participants received
explicit PT-instructions or unspeciﬁc task instructions. Further-
more, averaged across all orientations of the ﬁgures in the picture
plane substantial RT-increases for object-based instructions as
compared to both observer-based transformation or unspeciﬁc
instructions were found.
Although the ﬁndings of Zacks andTversky (2005) can be inter-
preted to reveal that PTs are naturally used for human ﬁgures
(if not instructed otherwise), in our opinion this does not pro-
vide indisputable evidence for PTs, as the following considerations
show: explicit object rotation instructions (e.g.,“imagine theﬁgure
rotating until it is upright,” p. 281) may induce OTs (i.e., picture-
plane rotations of the front-facing ﬁgure) that are not the same
OTs that can be assumed to be at work with unconstrained task
instructions (i.e., shortest path object rotations of front-facing to
back-facing ﬁgures). In other words, ﬁnding positive RT-slopes
with explicit instructions to rotate the object in the picture plane
speaks against the use of such OTs with non-speciﬁc instructions
(i.e., ﬂat slopes), but not against other types of OTs as a strategy
spontaneously adapted by observers. Further doubt concerning
a PT-interpretation of near-zero slopes comes from ﬁndings that
reveal ﬂatter or missing RT-slopes with ﬁgure stimuli in a standard
mental rotation task (Amorim et al., 2006), as well as in a hand lat-
erality identiﬁcation task when a palm view of the human hand is
presented (Ionta and Blanke, 2009). Without going into the par-
ticular nature of the underlying mechanisms (e.g., embodiment),
such ﬁndings suggest that the absence of RT-slopes should not be
regarded as positive evidence to dismiss OT-accounts.
Perspective transformations vs. OT/AT-instructions can also
be manipulated by using stimuli rotated in the depth plane (i.e.,
the plane for which PTs in OBT- and AIS-tasks have been pos-
tulated). In memory-based AIS-tasks this has consistently yielded
different RT-proﬁles (Wraga et al., 2000). Using a visual AIS-task
with laterality decisions, Keehner et al. (2006) obtained compara-
ble results, ﬁnding, in addition, differential brain activation for
PT- vs. OT-instructions, supporting the assumption of process-
ing differences between both. Although the experimental setup in
Keehner et al. (2006) confounds rotations in the depth plane with
incompatibility, this confound was, on average, equal for the PT-
and OT-instructions. This seems a promising approach to gain
further insight into the processes invoked by different transforma-
tion instructions (for other examples see Zacks et al., 2003; Tadi
et al., 2009; Wraga et al., 2010).
EVIDENCE FOR SPONTANEOUS PERSPECTIVE TRANSFORMATIONS
Whereas the evidence reported so far does not seem compelling
in ruling out alternative transformation accounts of OBT- and
AIS-performances, more convincing evidence for PTs comes from
research in which observers make laterality decisions regard-
ing their current perspective on a visual scene, showing that
task performance suffers interference from the depicted avatar’s
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perspective. More speciﬁcally, Zwickel (2009; also Zwickel and
Müller, 2013) presented animations of simple geometrical shapes
and asked participants to make left/right decisions – from their
own perspective – about brieﬂy presented dots. Performance in
this task was impaired when the laterality of the dot mismatched
its laterality regarding the perspective ascribed to the animated
ﬁgure. Obviously, such a ﬁnding could not result from a con-
founding with spatial compatibility, because responding always
corresponded to the laterality of the critical feature from the
observer’s perspective. It also does not seem reasonable to assume
that OTs operated on the avatar-stimulus itself. The fact that no
similar interference effects for laterality decisions about OBT-
stimuli from their own perspective (i.e., which-side-task) were
found, suggests that ascriptions of agency and/or embodied pro-
cessing of the stimuli may be a prerequisite for spontaneous
perspective taking (for discussions e.g., Kessler and Thomson,
2010; Kockler et al., 2010; Surtees and Apperly, 2012). This line
of research seems interesting to pursue, as it could build a bridge
to research on perspective conﬂicts and interference effects in cog-
nitive (May, 2004, 2007; Wang, 2004; Kelly et al., 2007; Keehner
and Fischer, 2012), as well as emotional and social perspective tak-
ing (Vogeley et al., 2004; Decety and Jackson, 2006; Duran et al.,
2011; Mazzarella et al., 2013).
CONCLUSION
Our review reveals that there is less support for the assumption that
visual perspective taking is based on observer-based PTs than one
would believe when looking at the literature. The foregoing analy-
sis of OBT- and AIS-studies using laterality judgments (and these
are the majority of studies) reveals a quite complicated research
situation with different problems standing in the way of a PT-
account of visual perspective taking. On the one hand, OBT- or
AIS-studies using laterality judgments have problems to separate
spatial incompatibility costs from transformation costs, making
compatibility a potential alternative explanation for some of the
ﬁndings. On the other, there is at least some evidence that spatial
transformations play a role in visual perspective taking, but little
evidence that PT-accounts of this role are more convincing than
OT-accounts in case of OBT-performances, orAT-accounts in case
of AIS-performances.
RECOMMENDATIONS
In order for future research to further close in on the mechanisms
underlying visual perspective taking the following methodological
recommendations might be helpful:
(1) When using OBT- or AIS-tasks in combination with later-
ality decisions, take effective measures to control for spatial
compatibility.
(2) The measure taken should allow disentangling the inde-
pendent contributions of spatial transformation and spatial
conﬂict costs (for steps in this direction see Gardner and
Potts, 2011, or May and Wendt, 2012, similar measures are
conceivable for AIS-tasks).
(3) To exclude compatibility inﬂuences altogether, non-lateralized
spatial judgments should be preferred; for example,
same/different decisions in OBT-tasks, force-choice decisions,
object naming or object counting in AIS-tasks. When using
such tasks, look out and control for possible hidden laterality
inﬂuences (e.g., uneven spatial distribution of features/objects
in both tasks).
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